Counter-Fear-Based-Operations

A few years ago, the US Military came up with a new euphemism for its emerging operational doctrine. “Effects-Based-Operations” or EBO seemed to be the perfect catch-all – it was short, catchy, ostensibly said what it intended to mean, and conveyed a sense of “thinking through things” before letting the cannonballs fly. It certainly was not as evocative or provocative as “Shock and Awe”, especially as Shock and Awe apparently did neither outside of the immediate blast radius of the bombs. Unfortunately, as much of corporate America already knows, coming up with an advertising campaign is often much easier than creating a product worthy of being advertised.

The challenge to the US forces has been to come up with a clear effect desired that can actually be realized by the operation planned. We want the effect to be the removal of the Taliban or other insurgents from an area. So, we plan a kinetic operation that involves major military muscle movements to go in and clear a district (or two or three) of Taliban. Sure enough, the insurgents all but disappear – nobody has seen them, “No Taliban here – they are all in the “next” village – but they are very bad”. And so forth. Eventually we give up, declare victory and pull back to our bases and then we wonder how the insurgents all reappear so quickly. After all, these people should embrace freedom and democracy, right? The root of this problem is, as David Kilcullen recently put it, “We’ve been fighting the insurgents, not the insurgency.”

The Taliban and other insurgent forces in Afghanistan, on the other hand, have a very clear idea of the effect that they want to create. Fear. Pure and simple, FEAR. I call their doctrine “Fear-Based-Operations” or FBO for short, and it is wonderfully simple and almost guaranteed to work, as opposed to our own Effects-Based-Operations. It is basically an information campaign backed up by targeted kinetic operations, in effect, turning our normal “kinetic ops with information supporting” on its head.

This nature of the fundamental relationship between kinetic operations and non-kinetic, or information operations marks the main difference between EBO and FBO is the. Kinetic operations are those involving troop movements, close air support, troops in contact, presence patrols, etc. Non-kinetic, or information operations are those designed to change perceptions and or beliefs. In the old days, information operations involved leaflet drops, “psyop broadcasts”, and radio propaganda. The US and Coalition militaries see the kinetic operation as the main effort with everything else supporting – even when it isThe Afghan Insurgents actually make it much simpler. It is a broadsheet posted on the door to the village mosque in the night. The sheet informs the residents that anyone found with ink on their fingers on election day will have their finger cut off, or their head cut off, or their family massacred in their sleep (all of which have been threatened this election season). This non-kinetic message instills the fear of the unknown – can they follow through, will they follow through – is it worth my finger/head/family to vote?

All it takes are a few kinetic actions to cement this fear in the average Afghan psyche. One or two people are made examples of beforehand – beaten for having a voter-registration card, or blown up by an IED after visiting a registration center. Of course, the insurgents are not bound by any law of war, criminal law, or anything else, so they have the freedom to do these types of actions. We, the coalition do not have this same freedom – we must fight for and by the rule of law, which is actually a huge advantage, but we squander it miserably.

The only way to counter Fear-Based-Operations is to create the opposite of fear – Hope. Hope is a commodity in extremely short supply here in Afghanistan. It has been crushed and ground out of the everyday existence of many Afghans over the past 30 years of virtually constant warfare. This withering if hope is shown in the omnipresent “Inshallah” – as God wills it. The main difference is that people WANT to hope – they do not want to fear – so hope, like a perennial weed, keeps creeping back into the psyche. After all, it’s got to get better than this, right? Inshallah?

So, the challenge to the Coalition Forces in Afghanistan is to create and implement “Hope-Based-Operations” where “Hope” is the desired effect. Now, after we roll into a village, “clearing” it of insurgents, we must roll in the civil assistance – in a coordinated effort. This means we should probably screen and train the Police and Government officials who come in to reestablish the Government presence beforehand – no corruption allowed. If we damage property, we fix it better than it was before. We help the village help itself improve by supplying materials and technical skills – but we hire and pay the villagers to do the labor to instill ownership. We do what it takes to get the family, village, and tribal elders to support us, reinforcing their respected positions vis a vis the Government officials. If we kill someone, we make it good with the families (even if they are bad guys). If we detain someone, we inform the village elders so they can inform the families. Mostly, we show patience and we follow through on our word and reinforce the rule of law.

The messages we MUST convey are direct contradictions to the messages the insurgents cannot but send: “They take, we give”, “they hurt, we heal”, “they destroy, we build”, “they come and go in the night, we stand by you 24 hours a day”. These are the very essence of Counter-Fear-Based-Operations. The Coalition cannot do it alone – the Afghan Security Forces must buy-in and adopt this wholeheartedly.

Unfortunately, the bulk of the US Military is ill-equipped to implement or execute this type of strategy. Bluntly speaking, they have been trained to kill and destroy a conventional enemy – and they are exceptionally good at that. They distrust these “touchy-feely” ways and just wish the “damn Taliban bastards would come out and fight like men”. Hooah! What is needed is to assemble a group who can do this, who have been trained by the likes of Chuck DeCaro in his SoftWar Doctrine at the National Defense University or guys like John Nagl – a soldier with a thousand pound brain if there ever was one. Unconventional thinkers who “get” that hope beats fear just as paper beats rock every time.

This group could then train and advise the Coalition leadership in Afghanistan, to include the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police forces. They have leaders like LTG Karimi of the ANA and LTG Mangal of the ANP do understand these concepts and who can provide the direction from above. At the lower levels, we control both the purse strings and most of the logistics infrastructure supporting these forces.

I realize that this may be “pie-in-the-sky”, but there is a rising chorus singing almost this same melody. The question at hand is do we have the right composers and conductors who can bring out the power and the beauty in the music? Not without help.